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Abstract

The subprime mortgage crisis occurred due to a number of factors. Included in these
factors were the issuance of subprime loans, the securitization of mortgages in the
investment banking system, and the deregulation and ultimate failure of the shadow
banking system. These causes were evident in both historical trends in the stock market
as well as the macroeconomic data leading into the crash. They were perpetuated by
investors, mortgage brokers, and banks taking on an abnormal amount of risk in the early
2000s for both psychological and behavioral reasons. These causes, while less than
obvious at the time, have, with the benefit of hindsight, become clearer. Thus, the
subprime mortgage crisis and subsequent recession were entirely avoidable and could
have been prevented.
Keywords: subprime mortgage, collateralized debt obligation, mortgage backed
security

THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE COLLAPSE
The Subprime Mortgage Collapse and Its Effects on the Economy
Introduction
A Year for the Record Books
The subprime mortgage crisis was caused primarily by defaults on home
mortgages, a traditionally stable investment (Demyanyk & Van Hemert, 2011). Because
investment banks were heavily invested in mortgages, the investment banks began to
panic. Next, commercial banks, who traded assets with the investment banks, began to
shy away from accepting mortgages as collateral, causing the investment banks to panic
even more (Van Doren, 2010). Finally, the stock market plummeted as banks and
investors alike pulled out of investments. This spiral spawned a lackluster economy with
feeble spending, which began the Great Recession.
This destructive loss in capital was unforeseen and caught most Americans
unprepared. Indeed, the dramatic loss in value of the stock market from 2007-2009, in
conjunction with the failure of the subprime loan market, is responsible for the
bankruptcy of numerous small businesses, thousands of home foreclosures, and the
collapse of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, two of Wall Street’s most well respected
investment banks (Nicholls, 2011).
Post-Recession Boom
The next few years, however, saw the recovery of the economy. As the Obamaera reforms were implemented, the economy began to grow once again (Peschek, 2011).
As of 2017, the markets have more than doubled in value since their low point in 2007,
with the Dow recently passing the 20,000 threshold. However, corresponding earnings
have not doubled since 2007, nor have company assets. In fact, the past 10 years have
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been filled with the slowest economic recovery of all time. U.S. gross domestic product
growth has hovered around a paltry 1.5%, while average take-home income has stagnated
and home ownership has shrunk (Aguirre & Reese, 2014). However, investors and, to
some extent, the American people believe that the markets are on solid footing. Based on
this evidence, there are two likely situations. Either the markets are solid and there is
some cause for the rapid market growth of the last decade which needs to be factored in,
or the current conditions are strikingly similar to the circumstances which contributed to
the horrific subprime mortgage crisis. Because of this, it is important to understand the
context of the subprime mortgage crisis and the events leading up to it. Thus, it is useful
to investigate the actions that were taken by both the federal government, and the banks
leading up to the subprime mortgage crisis, the factors which contributed to the stock
market’s rapid recovery, and the differences between the market conditions in 2007 and
now.
Historical Trends
Economic Measures
It is difficult to understand the macroeconomic trends of 2007-2010 without first
understanding some basics about the stock market and the American Economy. In
calculating the growth of the economy, there are several indicators to evaluate. Most
important is the growth rate of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the United States.
Other indicators of the health of the economy include the consumer price index (CPI), the
unemployment rate, the federal funds rate, and the average take-home pay. These factors,
when interpreted together, give a fairly accurate picture of the overall performance of the
economy. However, in evaluating the stock market and growth trends within it, it is

THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE COLLAPSE

6

important to recognize that while the stock market is somewhat correlated to the overall
economy, it operates on a lag and lacks complete correlation (Chen, 2009). Growth in the
economy does not translate immediately into growth in the markets, nor vice versa. This
is not to say, though, that the two are not related. In fact, the stock markets, and
specifically, the S&P 500 are considered leading indicators of economic trends.
The Great Depression and the Economics of Recessions
In 1929, the stock market experienced one of the worst days of all time. It is now
known as the Wall Street Crash of 1929, or simply, Black Tuesday. Following World
War 1, enthusiasm was high, and spending was obscene. The Roaring Twenties ushered
in an era of decadence and excess, mostly financed by debt (Garrison, 1993). As post-war
confidence grew, so did investment opportunities. This created a period of dramatic
economic growth. The Federal Reserve, attempting to keep the growth period alive, cut
interest rates. However, all was not well in the American economy. Due to the artificially
low interest rates, investment became a more attractive alternative to saving (Garrison,
1993). Thus, dramatic amounts of borrowed money were injected into an economy with
nowhere to send the money. As production growth tapered off and debt rose, some
investors began to suspect that the economic growth was unsustainable (Garrison, 1993).
On March 25, 1929, investors became aware that the markets were due for a
correction when the Federal Reserve warned that speculation had led to significant
overvaluation of stocks. After an initial loss in market value, however, investors declined
to heed this warning, and continued to pour money into the stock market. In the following
three months, market value increased by over 20%. Unfortunately, the growth period was
short lived, and by mid-September of 1929, investors began unloading their positions.

THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE COLLAPSE

7

The growth cycle was broken, and prices began to drop drastically. By October, the
market was losing value nearly every day. The selloff reached its peak on October 29,
1929, when the market lost an additional 12% of its value. This horrible period on Wall
Street kicked off the Great Depression (Garrison, 1993).
The Great Depression marks a low point of the American economy. Rarely has
the Federal Reserve been so wrong and failed so spectacularly (Klein, 2001). However, it
is far from the only time that the economy has struggled for positive growth. Between
1899 and 2004, the American economy has experienced 22 recessions, or nominal
declines in GDP lasting two or more quarters (Sam Stovall, 2004). This averages to a
recession around every five years. These recessions were typically accompanied by a
drop in stock market value, whether or not the recession preceded or proceeded the stock
market correction.
Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Far from Unpredictable
The Housing Market
The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the subsequent Great Recession were
preceded by the collapse of one specific sector: housing. There were a number of factors
that contributed to the housing crisis and collapse that began in 2007, but the most
significant factor was the growth of subprime mortgage loans. Alan Greenspan, the
former chairman of the Federal Reserve, said of the mortgage market of the early 2000s
“where once marginal applicants would have simply been denied credit, lenders are now
able to quite efficiently judge the risk posed by individuals and price that risk
appropriately” (Burry, 2010, p. WK10). These subprime loans are a finance agreements
in which loan applicants lack the credit history, income, or assets traditionally required to
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qualify for a loan (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, & Vig, 2010). Due to the lack of income,
credit, or assets, these loans are inherently much riskier than traditional loans, which
forces the loan issuer to increase the yield on the loan. This yield increase causes the loan
to be more difficult to pay off, which makes the borrower’s default rate higher, which in
turn increases risk. Thus, the loans are known as subprime, with the borrower being
below the requirements for a prime rate loan. Because of their inherent riskiness,
subprime mortgage loans historically account for a small portion of the lending market
(Coleman, Little, & Vandell, 2008).
Brave New World
Historically, new subprime mortgages accounted for around 8% of the mortgage
market. However, from 2004-2006, subprime mortgages made up 20% of the market
(Coleman, Little, & Vandell, 2008). At that time, “subprime mortgages featured a unique
security design that depended on home price appreciation; the mortgages were essentially
short maturity, requiring refinancing” (Gorton, 2009, p. 567). Furthermore, in 2006, 35%
of tracked loans were interest only loans (Immergluck, 2008). This entire mortgage
system worked only in a housing market in which home prices were rising; the moment
home prices dropped, subprime mortgages would begin to default (Gorton, 2009).
Not only were subprime adjustable rate mortgages in abundance preceding the
subprime mortgage crisis, general requirements for taking on debt were unprecedentedly
low (Coleman, Little, & Vandell, 2008). This led to an overall increase in consumer debt.
“U.S. households had become increasingly indebted, with the ratio of debt to disposable
personal income rising from 77% in 1990 to 127% at the end of 2007” (University of
North Carolina, 2012). As debt increased, risk in lending also increased. As the
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underlying finances of the everyday family began to decay, due in part to the high
amount of debt and compounded by stagnating take-home pay, the credit risk the lending
institutions were taking on increased dramatically (UNC, 2012). In 2006, the housing
market stalled. Conventional wisdom at the time was the market slowdown was
temporary and there was no housing bubble. However, prices had peaked, and it became
increasingly difficult for borrowers to favorably refinance. By 2007, the bubble had
begun to collapse in on itself. As the teaser rates (initially low interest rates on adjustable
rate mortgages which, after a set period, are adjusted according to the prime rate) on
subprime mortgages expired and rates were hiked, delinquencies rates on mortgages
began to climb (Chart 1). It is interesting to note that the delinquency rates climbed
drastically for subprime adjustable rate mortgages, slightly less for subprime fixed rate,
less still for prime adjustable rate, and barely at all for prime fixed rate mortgages. This is
Chart 1 (Richmond Fed, 2011)
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a graphical representation of the default risk of these types of mortgages.
Delinquencies and Foreclosures
Between 2006 and 2008, the housing market peaked and home prices began to
drop (UNC, 2012). During the same period, as borrowers were unable to refinance their
loans at an attractive rate, mortgages began to default at unprecedented rates. This alone,
however, was not enough to bring the economy to its knees.
Debt and Collateral
Mortgage Backed Securities
Mortgages are loans that are collateralized by property. They are issued by a bank
or a lending organization in return for regular principal and interest payments. An
individual mortgage is often traded or sold from one institution to another. “Mortgagebacked securities (MBS) are debt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from
pools of mortgage loans, most commonly on residential property” (SEC, 2010). An MBS
is a bundle of separate individual mortgages structured to pay out cash flows as they are
received from borrowers. In the late 1990’s and into the 2000’s mortgage-backed
securities were seen as a low-risk, high-reward investment tool (Bhat, Frankel, & Martin,
2011). Furthermore, credit ratings on MBS were very high when compared to individual
loans. The MBSs were rated higher than their underlying mortgages because they were
considered diversified assets (Xudong, et al., 2015). In reality, they were only as
diversified as the underlying loans, but few people bothered to look at the underlying
loans, and the ratings remained high. Because of the high credit ratings and relatively
high returns on MBS, the MBS began to increase in popularity throughout the 2000’s,
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especially with banks, which used the debt instrument to increase financial leverage
(Bhat, et al., 2011).
In the mid 2000’s, the prevailing wisdom was that the markets were solid and that
there was little to no chance of mortgage bonds defaulting (Crouhy, Jarrow, & Turnbull,
2008). Because of this overconfidence, the markets continued to grow at unprecedented
rates. Following the market crash in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, investors felt that
the markets were due for a growth period. While they were right, the market did grow,
they were wrong in the long term (Morris & Alam, 2012). When forecasting the future
performance of the markets, investors used past growth rates as their basis. However,
when predicting the market’s growth, people tend to ignore the bad years and glorify the
good years. In fact, by 2005, the dot-com bubble was a distant memory, and investors
subscribed to the belief that the bubble was a one-time mistake that would not be
repeated (Morris & Alam, 2012).
Collateralized Debt Obligation
The mortgage backed security was the beginning of a long list of instruments
which could be used to hold mortgage debt and collect the ensuing cash flows. However,
very quickly, more sophisticated methods emerged.
A Collateralized Debt Obligation is an asset backed security whose underlying
collateral is typically a portfolio of (corporate or sovereign) bonds or bank loans.
A CDO cash flow structure allocates interest income and principle repayments
from a collateral pool of different debt instruments to a prioritized collection of
CDO securities, which we call ‘tranches.’ (Duffie & Garleanu, 2001, p 40)
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Through the CDO and its cousin, the synthetic CDO, investors were able to invest in the
mortgage backed securities without actually investing in the mortgages themselves. This
enabled investors and banks to multiply their capital by betting on securities apart from
actually investing in those securities. If it seems senseless, rest assured, it is. “In perfect
capital markets, CDOs would serve no purpose; the costs of constructing and marketing a
CDO would inhibit its creation… …the [real world] value lies in reducing the amount of
(expensive) regulatory capital [banks] must hold” (Duffie & Garleanu, 2001, p. 41). The
CDO as a wraparound for MBS is cost-ineffective. However, banks wanted a way to
transfer risk and increase required reserve capital. Because of this, they sold CDOs to
transfer capital and ensure they remained within Federal guidelines for capital
requirements. This was just one way of increasing leverage within an investment bank
while making it seem like the bank was not acting speculative (Duffie & Garleanu, 2001).
The problem was because so many separate investments were being made all
collateralized by mortgages, the initial value of the mortgages was expanded into a bond
and security market much larger than the mortgages themselves. As the housing market
grew, the MBS market grew exponentially, and the CDO market grew exponentially to
that (UNC, 2012). By 2006, the home equity asset backed security (MBS) market had
grown to $630 billion, with an additional $258 billion in CDOs and collateralized loan
obligations (Thompson, Callahan, O’Toole, & Rajendra, 2007). In 2005, the issuance of
mortgage backed CDOs grew by 100%. The banks were betting big on mortgages.
Credit Default Swap
Credit default swaps “are contracts in which one party sells protection to another
against a failure (by a third party) to make contractual debt repayments; they are said to
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be naked if the protection buyer does not also hold the underlying security” (Che & Sethi,
2014, p. 2). These swaps were created as a sort of insurance policy against defaults on
mortgage bonds. A bank issues them to individuals or banks which wish to bet against a
certain bond or security. Many banks in 2006-2008 both issued and bought these swaps,
leading to hedging of bets and multilateral positions. However, because owning the
security in question is not necessary to a credit default swap, much of the market
surrounding the swap was speculative. In fact, the actual value of credit default swap
contracts in the United States before the subprime mortgage crisis was estimated to be as
high as ten times higher than the value of the underlying bonds upon which the swaps
were based (Che & Sethi, 2014).
Speculation
Speculation was a critical aspect of the markets leading into the subprime
mortgage crisis, and when the crash happened, the amplification of the underlying bonds
by credit default swaps made the crash exponentially worse. At the time, however, none
of this was worrisome to investors.
One argument for the benefits of credit derivatives to borrowers stems from the
observation that they facilitate the separation of funding from exposure to credit
risk. This allows borrowers to raise funds even from those who are relatively
pessimistic about their ability to repay, since this group of investors can shed
credit risk by purchasing protection. Meanwhile, those who are most optimistic
about future borrower revenues can sell protection, and thereby expose
themselves to credit risk on a scale that would not be possible without derivatives.
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These effects should shift the terms of financing in favor of borrowers while
broadening the range of assets available to investors (Che & Sethi, 2014, p. 2).
The problem with this logic is that it assumes that consumer choice is always a good
thing. At its core, this argument suggests everyone should have the ability to borrow
money, regardless of their ability to pay it back (as long as someone is willing to take on
the risk of a failed investment). However, through diversification, risk in the credit
default swap was masked, so that investors were unable to see that not only were the
loans upon which the swap was based likely to fail, but also that the entire financial
industry had been swept up in a massive bubble which must inevitably pop.
Secondary Markets
ABX.HE
When the housing market finally did begin to fail, and home prices fell, no one
really knew what to expect. Because home mortgages experience a lag related to housing
price changes, there was a period in which home prices fell without large amounts of
mortgage defaults. Furthermore, due to the nature of securitization tranches, CDO
liabilities, and other structured liability vehicles, there are no secondary markets available
to investors for these products (Gorton, 2009). However, in 2006, dealer banks launched
a synthetic index of subprime risk, the ABX.HE. The ABX.HE is a derivative referencing
an index linked to 20 subprime residential mortgage securitization transactions which had
been issued in the six months prior and equally weighted (Gorton, 2009). When the lag
finally caught up to the mortgages, and they began to default, faith in the securitization
instruments on mortgage debt failed. The ABX.HE index lost value, and faith in the
underlying mortgages faltered as well. “The decline in the ABX prices revealed the shock
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to the valuation of subprime risk, but it did not reveal where these risks resided. That
uncertainty caused a loss of confidence in credit” (Gorton, 2009, p 572).
Shadow Banking System
In 1999, the Clinton administration repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, the bill
passed in 1933 to prevent future collapses in the banking industry. The bill certainly had
flaws, for example, at one point it prohibited the paying of interest on deposit accounts
(this clause was repealed in the 1980’s) (Lucas, 2013). However, there was one particular
provision in the law which could have prevented the subprime mortgage crisis. The
Glass-Steagall act put a barrier in place between investment banks and depository
institutions. However, in 1999, the act was repealed, allowing for the mixing of
investment and traditional banks. This created what is known as the shadow banking
system, in which “excess corporate and investor cash is ‘deposited’ in (what used to be
called) investment banks. Because those banks were outside the regulated depositinsurance commercial banking system, the investment banks supplied collateral to the
depositors to ‘guarantee’ the deposits” (Van Doren, 2010). These loans are known as
repo agreements. The investment bank would be required to pay back the depository
institution by the end of a certain period, often only a day or two. If the investment bank
did not repay the money, the depository institution would simply take possession of the
collateral. Initially, the collateral was limited to federally insured securities, such as
Treasury Bonds. However, as the market grew and demand increased, securitized loans
began to be issued as collateral. In 2007, the repo market was estimated to be around $12
trillion (Gorton, 2009). These loans often took the form of CDOs and MBSs. When the
market for these bonds began to fail in 2007 and 2008, the institutions holding them
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began to demand their cash, resulting in what can only be described as a run on shadow
banks. However, because banks were no longer interested in issuing loans with securities
as collateral (because of the falling market for the securities), there were no new
collateralized loans. Furthermore, the market for the underlying bonds had completely
disappeared. Due to the deleveraging going on among investment banks, no one was
interested in buying bonds securitized by mortgages. This lack of interest in purchasing
bonds led to a lack of prices for the securities. If the value of the asset cannot be
calculated due to a lack of liquidity, then the lender has no interest in the security, and
will not engage in the repo. (Gorton, 2009). This is what lead to the massive drop in price
in the ABX.HE index, which represented the underlying mortgage bonds. The bonds
were no good to investment banks, because they could not be used as collateral with a
depository institution. Their lack of value as a collateral was, of course, due to the lack of
marketability of the bonds, which stemmed from their massive underlying risk. Thus, the
failure of the subprime mortgages led to the failure of the entire shadow banking industry
(Gorton, 2009).
Hot Hand Fallacy
Lying vs. Being Wrong: The Difference is Intent
There is a distinct difference between an incorrect statement stemming from a
lack of knowledge and a statement delivered by someone knowing the statement to be
false. The former is merely a case of poor judgement, whereas the latter is a flat out lie.
While both have the potential to damage, one is intentional, and thus is more egregious of
an offence. To that point, lying is systemically condemned within society. However,
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speculating on events which are unknowable is not condemned, but employed by almost
every industry in the world.
On one end of the spectrum, marketing divisions make assumptions about a
population based on data sets not completely represented of the whole. On the other side,
middle aged men travel to Vegas to bet large amounts of money on events completely
beyond their control or knowledge. However, both examples display individuals making
choices stemming from information which is impossible to know completely. These
choices are necessary because of the unknowability of the future. It is impossible to know
and accurately predict the future. This idea, known as the uncertainty principle, is the
foundation upon which every forecasting model is based. Forecasting models are
necessary because the future is unknowable. Once the future becomes the past, the model
is must be modified to accurately reflect the reality of the facts. This happens until the
model is able to accurately predict the future, within acceptable error margins. However,
predicting the future is an arduous task (Cranford, 2010).
“They Wanted to be Right”
In the years leading up to 1999, the market seemed unstoppable. Markets were up,
especially in the technology sector, and it seemed that all was well (Growing pains: dotcom bubble 2.0, 2013). Everyone was riding the dot-com bubble, betting that each new
tech company was going to be the next big thing. This was the new broker’s chance to
show everyone he was a big-shot, so they bet on the hot new company. They bet big.
However, as so often is the case, the analysts were wrong, and the technology sector
experienced a devastating crash. “There were, of course, those that saw it coming, and
refused to believe that the fundamentals of valuation had changed” (Growing pains: dot-
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com bubble 2.0, 2013). Some investors recognized that a massive growth in a stock price
unaccompanied by an increase in earnings, revenue, or any other metric is unsustainable.
Of course, in 2000 the bubble burst, and those who had looked deeper were proven right.
Numbers don’t lie (Growing pains: dot-com bubble 2.0, 2013).
Speculation Fuels the Fire
There is a fundamental flaw in the human psyche. When a person makes a
decision, that person desperately wants to be correct. Likewise, when an investor
purchases a stock, that investor desperately wants it to appreciate. Losing is not an
option. Thus, investors and bankers were quick to forget the mistakes of the dot-com
bubble in the interests of making more money. As confidence in the stock market grew,
the stocks began appreciating in a dramatic way. The value began to grow, which spurred
more investing, which, in turn, caused the stocks to increase in value. The merry-goround was spinning, and as more people began to push, it began to spin faster (Growing
pains: dot-com bubble 2.0, 2013).
However, there is an insidious truth to the stock market. The value of a stock is
only how much someone is willing to pay for it. Stock has (for practical purposes) no real
value. This began to manifest in the markets following the crash of 2000. While earnings
growth remained stable, the growth rate in the markets increased dramatically. In
hindsight, it is easy to see what happened and that investors were overestimating future
returns, but at the time, people wanted to be right so badly that they were willing to
overlook the telltale signs in the market (Immergluck, 2011). (This is similar to your
favorite National Football League (NFL) team being down by two touchdowns with 10
minutes left in the fourth quarter. Statistically, it is extremely unlikely that your team
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would win the game, and anyone watching the game objectively could see this. However,
the avid fan would, in that situation, honestly believe that their team could come back and
win the game.)
This is the problem that the investors on Wall Street encountered following the
dot-com bubble. They were desperate to be right. The markets had suffered from a
massive crash in 2000, and from a smaller hiccup following the tragedy of 9/11.
However, in the early 2000’s, the economy was growing, and confidence began rising.
The big banks were searching for a winner, and when they found one, they ran with it.
After the downturn from 2000-2002, the markets began to win again (chart 2). From its
low in 2002 of just over 7,500, the market nearly doubled in size. Investors were feeling
bullish, and they were ready to make some money. After all, the market had just crashed
Chart 2 (Morningstar, n.d.)
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in 2000, and that must mean that securities were undervalued. Investors began to buy
again, causing massive gains in the stock market. As the markets trended up, more and
more people began to invest, fueling even more gains. Markets swung up once again,
gaining back more than they had lost in 2000. Only five years after the dot-com crash, the
Dow Jones Industrial Average peaked at 14,164.53, an annualized gain of 13.5% since
2000.
Behavioral Economics
The field of Behavioral Economics explains the subprime mortgage crisis in a
more complete way than any other single explanation for the crash. It encompasses why
the crash occurred, at a very human level. It explains why people bought into the idea of
high rates of subprime mortgages, and rising home prices unsustainable by the economy,
and CDO’s and swaps. The field of Behavioral Economics is the intersection of
psychology and economics, and seeks to explain how individuals behave in real-world
environments instead of how they might behave in a theoretical situation, acting perfectly
rational (Thorgeirsson & Kawachi, 2013). Thus, it seeks to investigate how markets
actually operate instead of how they should operate. This field explains the
disproportionately high risk that was being taken on during the expansion of the housing
market in the mid-2000’s by noting the perceived risk of MBS at the time were relatively
low. According to a study by Ludger Schuknecht, the Directorate General Economics at
the European Central Bank, and Luca Agnello of the University of Palermo in Italy, the
period from 1980 to the crash of 2007 “took place in an environment of strong financial
innovation, and as it turned out, insufficient risk management, lack of transparency, poor
incentives and increasing leverage” (Agnello & Schuknecht, 2011, p. 171). These factors
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all contributed to the banks and lenders increased risk taking. Because the lenders
themselves did not hold the mortgages, but instead, sold them to banks, who packaged
them into MBS, which were then sold to consumers, other banks, and collateralized into
CDO’s which were hedged by swaps, the amount of risk involved with the mortgages
was actually lost during the numerous repackaging of the loans. The lenders themselves
had no incentive to accurately represent the risk of the individual loans, nor did the
banks, nor did the companies selling the swaps on the loans. Thus, investment banks took
on a disproportionate amount of liquidity and market risk without knowing it.
Furthermore, while banks would hedge against price fluctuations on MBS, they would
also issue swaps for other banks to do so (many of which were naked) which, based on
the risk models of the time, was within their boundaries (naked swaps refer to a contract
in which neither party owns the underlying security). However, the risk models were
wrong and based on faulty information. Therefore, even though the banks thought they
were hedging their bets, they were actually doing the opposite (Agnello & Schuknecht,
2011).
Signs of the Times
Consumer Debt
There are always signals of impending doom. One of the key signs preceding the
recession of 2008 was a drastic rise in consumer debt. By the end of 2007, the debt of
American households as a percentage of annual disposable personal income was 127%,
up from only 77% in 1990 (UNC, 2012). During the early-mid 2000s, houses were rising
in value while consumers were spending more money and saving less. The difference
between disposable income and spending was made up by debt, accounting for the

THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE COLLAPSE

22

ballooning household debt by the end of 2007. By decreasing spending in excess of
income in the early 2000’s, households could have decreased debt, including the toxic
subprime loans, and, partially, softened the blow of the subprime mortgage crisis. In
many ways, this mirrors the crisis in 1929. Both crashes were preceded by excess
spending financed by debt, both crashes were preceded by excessive speculation and
unwarranted market growth, and both crashes were entirely avoidable. Clearly, they were
not brought about by the same stimuli; the two crashes were far from the same. However,
some of the same elements were present in the market preceding both market failures,
and this on its own is worth noting (Peicuti, 2014).
GDP Growth Rate
In 2000, the United States total gross domestic product (GDP) was 10.28 trillion.
From 2000 to 2007, the United States GDP averaged a 5% growth rate. By 2007, the
GDP had grown to 14.48 trillion (FRED, 2017). While this rate represents a steady
growth in the economy, it is completely outpaced by the growth in the stock market over
the same period of time. In fact, the annual rate difference between GDP growth and
DJIA growth is 8.5%. The stock market substantially outpaced real growth in the
economy, and, at the time of the stock market crash of 2007-2009, was severely
overvalued (Peicuti, 2014). This overvaluing of the market was largely due to the rapid
growth following the crash of 2001 without any real market contractions (Peicuti, 2014).
The market continued to gain ground in the mid 2000s without any signs of slowing
down. Instead of noticing this abnormal market behavior and becoming apprehensive of
additional investment, investors actually became more confident in the future (Peicuti,
2014).
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Speculation
Speculation was happening not only in the form of CDOs and credit default swaps,
but also by ordinary individuals purchasing a home. Many of the home purchases made in
the mid-2000’s were made with the purchaser knowing full well they could not afford the
payments on the houses. The purchaser was instead hoping to refinance at a lower rate,
after the housing market had risen and caused their investment to appreciate. This strategy
led to increasingly speculative home purchasing, as nearly 40% of homes were purchased
not as a primary residence (UNC, 2012). Frequently, individuals would purchase
condominiums which were still under construction, then flipped (sold) them for a profit
without living in the condo themselves. This type of behavior is, according to Yale
economist Robert Schiller, a social and psychological phenomenon. Speculation drives up
prices, which in turn fuels speculation. Warren Buffet put it this way in his testimony to
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC): “It was the greatest bubble I've ever seen
in my life... The entire American public eventually was caught up in a belief that housing
prices could not fall dramatically” (On the Docket, 2013).
The Causes
Mortgage Backed Securities: Not Very Secure
A large part of the problem leading into the subprime mortgage crisis was the
mortgage backed security. These financial instruments were believed to be safe against
default and loss: the fact of the matter is that they were not. Simply put, following the
crash of the housing market, Standard & Poor and Moody’s, the two biggest credit rating
agencies, downgraded the credit rating of trillions of dollars’ worth of mortgage backed
securities, demonstrating a complete failure to properly rate them in the first place
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(Birger, 2008). Because of these downgrades, banks were hit with liquidity
complications, and needed to improve their capital ratios to recover. The downgrade of
these mortgage backed securities, combined with the significant issues brought about by
credit default swaps, caused massive liquidity issues for all of the big investment banks.
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers both went bankrupt as a result of the financial crash
(Van Doren, 2008).
Stock Correction
Clearly, there was a major issue with the way the stock market was valued. An
8% difference between GDP growth and market growth is simply unsustainable. While
the two are not directly related, they are somewhat correlated. Because of this, when the
banks started panicking and investors began to realize that the CDO and MBS markets
were not stable, faith in the system quickly faded. As banks struggled to sell off their
mortgage instruments and increase their liquidity, the market began to take notice.
Investors began selling off stock, dumping large portions of their portfolios. As this
began to happen, the markets plummeted. By 2009, the Dow Jones Industrial Average
had lost nearly 50% of its value (Morningstar, n.d.).
Debt Decreases
Soon after the collapse of the housing market and the subsequent selloff in the
stock market, the amount of consumer debt decreased drastically. After the highs in debt
of the mid-2000s, consumers began to quickly liquidate their debt. In his 2010 written
testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Mark Zandi, the chief economist
of Moody’s Economist.com wrote:
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The credit crunch is clear in the lending statistics. The number of bank credit
cards in circulation has plunged by nearly 100 million, or more than 20%, since
peaking in the summer of 2008. Total household debt outstanding has dropped by
nearly $600 billion, a stunning 5%, over the same period. Credit card, auto,
consumer finance and mortgage debt are all falling. Commercial and industrial
loans outstanding are also falling quickly. According to the Federal Reserve, C&I
loans have declined by some $165 billion, or 20%, since peaking in late 2008. (3)
This massive drop in consumer debt was indicative of both a desire of American
consumer’s post-crash to reduce their debt and, perhaps more importantly, an
unwillingness of lenders to give out loans.
Aftermath
The Great Recession
Following the stock market crash of 2007-2009, the U.S., and indeed the world
economy was plunged into a recession which lasted nearly two years. From December of
2007 to August of 2009, the U.S. economy experienced negative GDP growth (Table 1).
Industrial production sank, while unemployment grew. The American economy stagnated
and faltered as businesses went under, banks closed their doors, and savings accounts
crumbled. The economy was finally pulled out of its recession (in part) by The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act in 2009. This act invested trillions of dollars into the
American economy, stopping the bleeding and filling the cracks in the banking industry.
This, along with the fiscal policies of the Obama administration, caused one of the
slowest and most steady recoveries in recent history. From 2009 to 2015, GDP has
averaged a growth rate of just over 2% (Long, 2016).
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TABLE 1 (National Bureau of Economic Research, n.d.)

Other Economic Indicators
Consumer credit outstanding (not including real estate loans) has grown each year
since 2011 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2016). In 2011, the
growth rate for consumer credit was 4.2%, with a total outstanding debt of 2.76 trillion
dollars. Four years later, in 2015, the growth rate was 7%. As of November of 2016,
outstanding consumer debt was 3.75 trillion dollars. In November, the credit growth rate
was 8%. When mortgage and real estate secured debt is included, the figures become
even more alarming. In fact, total American debt, including mortgages, auto loans,
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student loans, and all other debt, increased by 2.1% in the last three months of 2013
alone, a total of $241 billion (Frizell, 2014). This is the largest margin of increase since
Q3 of 2007 (Frizell, 2014). Global debt has also ballooned. “Seven years after the
bursting of a global credit bubble resulted in the worst financial crisis since the Great
Depression, debt continues to grow. Global debt in these years has grown by $57 trillion,
raising the ratio of debt to GDP by 17 percentage points” (Dobbs, Lund, Woetzel, &
Mutafchieva, 2015, p. 1). Debt is rising at alarming rates, and it is becoming easier and
easier to obtain debt.
Conclusion
It All Went Wrong
Looking back, it is easy to point out decisions that were made which led to the
subprime mortgage crisis. The overextension of investment banks, coupled with the
growth of the shadow banking system which was entirely dependent on subprime
mortgages which could only be sustained in a growing housing market created the perfect
storm which grew into a massive market correction. However, at the time, very few
people saw the crash coming. In fact, those who predicted a housing bubble were mocked
and ridiculed. Furthermore, it was only in hindsight that companies could see that they
had taken on too much risk. Although the businesses took on more risk than they should
have, the risk models of the time were inaccurate, and led to the overextension of many
banks and investment firms. Unfortunately, this is the nature of recessions. If people
could see them coming, they would not happen. If the banks and investors in 2007 had
known the real risk associated with each CDO they bought and each credit default swap
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they sold, they would not have sold them. It was only because they were unaware of the
real risk that they engaged in such risky behavior.
Evaluating Today’s Economy
Perhaps it is futile to attempt to predict economic declines. After all, market
performance is based almost exclusively on human psychology, a field that is impossible
to accurately predict (Of course, technical factors play a role. Nevertheless, even these
technical evaluations are made by people, influenced by psychology). However, markets
are cyclical and historically, there have always been declines following growth periods.
There is precedent for indicators of economic decline. The interest spread,
unemployment, and building permits for new private housing units are all leading
indicators of the future of the economy. The economy will never be perfectly efficient,
and there will always be abnormalities and understatement of risk. However, it is
irresponsible to ignore the possibility that the economy is not functioning properly. While
analysts and stock brokers say that the economy on solid footing, it is important to
remember that they said the same thing in 2007. There is wisdom in looking closer, at
taking a second look at the state of the economy. The massive downturn of 2007-2009
could have been avoided. There were leading indicators, as well as clear factors which
contributed to the collapse of the economy. The recession could have been avoided by
decreasing borrowing, increasing capital requirements for banks with REPO agreements,
or simply eliminating subprime mortgage loans (or forcing those issuing the loans to
carry the loan burden). These mistakes are clear and they are repeatable. Only by looking
to the past and understanding the shortcomings of the current system can the economy
avoid future failures.
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